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Through extended consideration of two wide classes of case studies —
dilute gases and linear systems — I explore the ways in which assump-
tions of probability and irreversibility occur in contemporary statistical
mechanics, where the latter is understood as primarily concerned with
the derivation of quantitative higher-level equations of motion, and only
derivatively with underpinning the equilibrium concept in thermodynam-
ics. I argue that at least in this wide class of examples, (i) irreversibility is
introduced through a reasonably well-defined initial-state condition which
does not precisely map onto those in the extant philosophical literature;
(ii) probability is explicitly required both in the foundations and in the
predictions of the theory. I then consider the same examples, as well as the
more general context, in the light of quantum mechanics, and demonstrate
that while the analysis of irreversibility is largely unaffected by quantum
considerations, the notion of statistical-mechanical probability is entirely
reduced to quantum-mechanical probability.
1 Introduction: the plurality of dynamics
What are the dynamical equations of physics? A first try:
Before the twentieth century, they were the equations of classical








Now we know that they are the equations of quantum mechanics:1
1For the purposes of this article I assume that the Schrödinger equation is exact in quantum
mechanics, and that ‘wavefunction collapse’, whatever its significance, is at any rate not a dy-
namical process. This clearly excludes the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986;
Pearle 1989; Bassi and Ghirardi 2003) and similar dynamical-collapse theories (see Albert
(2000) for extensive consideration of their statistical mechanics); it includes the Everett inter-
pretation (Everett 1957; Wallace 2012) and hidden-variable theories like Bohmian mechanics
(Bohm 1952; Bohm and Hiley 1993; Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghi 1996); in Wallace (2016) I
argue that it includes orthodox quantum mechanics, provided ‘orthodoxy’ is understood via
physicists’ actual practice.
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that is, Schrödinger’s equation,
d
dt
|ψ〉 = − i
h̄
Ĥ |ψ〉 . (2)
This answer is misleading, bordering on a category error. Hamilton’s equations,
and Schrödinger’s, are not concrete systems of equations but frameworks in
which equations may be stated. For any choice of phase space or Hilbert space,
and any choice of (classical or quantum) Hamiltonian on that space, we get a
set of dynamical equations. In classical mechanics, different choices give us:
• The Newtonian equations for point particles (better: rigid spheres) inter-
acting under gravity, generalisable to interactions under other potential-
based forces;
• The simple harmonic oscillator equations that describe springs and other
vibrating systems;
• Euler’s equations, describing the rotations of rigid bodies;
• Euler’s (other) equations, describing fluid flow in the regime where viscos-
ity can be neglected.
• (With a little care as to how the Hamiltonian dynamical framework han-
dles them), the field equations of classical electromagnetism and general
relativity.
In quantum mechanics, we also have
• The quantum version of the Newtonian equations, applicable to (e.g.)
nonrelativistic point particles interacting under some potential;
• The quantum version of the harmonic oscillator;
• The quantum field theories of solid-state physics, describing such varied
systems as superconductors and vibrating crystals;
• The quantum field theories of particle physics, in particular the Standard
Model, generally thought by physicists to underly pretty much all phe-
nomena in which gravity can be neglected and most in which it cannot.
All of these equations are widely used in contemporary physics, and all have been
thoroughly confirmed empirically in applications to the systems to which they
apply. And this is already something of a puzzle: how is it that physics doesn’t
just get by with one such system, the right such system? Even if that system is
far too complicated to solve in practice, that in itself does not guarantee us the
existence of other, simpler, equations, applicable in domains where the Right
System cannot be applied? Any systematic understanding of physics has to
grapple with the plurality of different dynamical equations it uses. Indeed, it
must grapple with the plurality of frameworks, for the classical equations, too,
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remain in constant use in contemporary physics. The problem of ‘the quantum-
classical transition’ is poorly understood if it is seen as a transition from one
dynamical system (quantum mechanics) to another; it is, rather, a problem of
understanding the many concrete classical dynamical equations we apply in a
wide variety of different situations.
But even this account greatly understates the plurality of dynamics. Some
more examples still:
• The equations of radioactive, or atomic, decay.
• The Navier-Stokes equation, describing fluid flow when viscocity cannot
be neglected.
• The Langevin equation, a stochastic differential equation describing the
behaviour of a large body in a bath of smaller ones, and the related Fokker-
Planck equation, describing the evolution of a probability distribution
under the Langevin equation.
• The Vlasov equation, describing the evolution of the particles in a plasma
— or the stars in a cluster or galaxy — in the so-called “collisionless”
regime.
• The Boltzmann equation, describing the evolution of the atoms or molecules
in a dilute (but not ‘collisionless’) gas.
• The Balescu-Lenard equation, describing the evolution of plasmas outside
the collisionless regime.
• The master equations of chemical dynamics, describing the change in
chemical (or nuclear) composition of a fluid when particles of one species
can react to form particles of another.
It is (as we shall see) a delicate matter which of these equations is classical and
which quantum. But at any rate, none of them fit into the dynamical framework
of either Hamiltonian classical mechanics or unitary quantum mechanics. In
fact, for the most part they have two features that are foreign to both:
1. They are probabilistic, either through being stochastic or, more commonly,
by describing the evolution of probability distributions in a way that can-
not be reduced to deterministic evolution of individual states. (In the
quantum case, they describe the evolution of mixed states in a way that
cannot be reduced to deterministic — much less unitary — evolution of
pure states.)
2. They are irreversible: in a sense to be clarified shortly, they build in a clear
direction of time, whereas both Hamilton’s equations and the Schrödinger
equation describe dynamics which are in an important sense time-reversal-
invariant.
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And again, these equations — and others like them — are very widely used
throughout physics, and very thoroughly tested in their respective domains.
One can imagine a world in which physics is simply a patchwork of over-
lapping domains each described by its own domain-specific set of equations,
with few or no connections between them. (Indeed, Nancy Cartwright (1983,
1999) makes the case that the actual world is like this.) But the consensus in
physics is that in the actual world, these various dynamical systems are con-
nected: equation A and equation B describe the same system at different levels
of detail, and equation A turns out to be derivable from equation B (perhaps
under certain assumptions). Indeed, it is widely held in physics that pretty
much every dynamical equation can ultimately, in principle, be derived from
the Standard Model, albeit sometimes through very long chains of inference via
lots of intermediate steps.
I don’t think it does great violence to physics usage to say that (non-
equilibrium) statistical mechanics just is the process of carrying out these con-
structions, especially (but not only) in the cases where the derived equations are
probabilistic and/or irreversible. But in any case, in this paper I want to pursue
a characterisation of the conceptual foundations of (non-equilibrium) statistical
mechanics as concerned with understanding how such constructions can be car-
ried out and what additional assumptions they make. The main conceptual
puzzles then concern precisely (1) the probabilistic and (2) the irreversible fea-
tures of (much) emergent higher-level dynamics; they can be dramatised as a
contradiction between two apparent truisms:
1. Derivation of probabilistic, irreversible higher-level physics from non-probabilistic,
time-reversal-invariant lower-level physics is impossible: probabilities can-
not be derived from non-probabilistic inputs without some explicitly prob-
abilistic assumptions, and more importantly, as a matter of logic time-
reversal invariant low-level dynamics cannot allow us to derive time-reversal-
noninvariant results.
2. Derivation of probabilistic, irreversible higher-level physics from non-probabilistic,
time-reversal-invariant lower-level physics is routine: in pretty much all of
the examples I give, and more besides, apparent derivations can be found
in the textbooks. And these derivations have novel predictive success,
both qualitatively (in many cases, such as the Boltzmann, Vlasov and
Balescu-Lenard equations, higher-level equations in physics are derived
from the lower level and then tested, rather than established phenomeno-
logically and only then derived) and quantitatively (statistical mechanics
provides calculational methods to work out the coefficients and param-
eters in higher-level equations from lower-level inputs, and does so very
successfully).
I want to suggest that we can make progress on resolving this apparent paradox
through three related strategies:
1. Focussing on the derivation of quantitative equations of motion, rather
than on the qualitative problem of how irreversibility could possibly emerge
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from underlying microphysics. The advantage of the former strategy is
that we actually have concrete ‘derivations’ of irreversible, probabilistic
microphysics all over modern statistical mechanics; identifying the actual
assumptions made in those derivations, and in particular focussing in on
those assumptions which have a time-reversal-noninvariant character, is
prima facie a much more tractable task than trying to work out in the
abstract what those assumptions might be.
2. Looking at examples from (relatively) contemporary physics. Insofar as
philosophy of statistical mechanics has considered the quantitative fea-
tures of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, it has generally focussed
on Boltzmann’s original derivation of the eponymous equation, and of
later attempts to improve the mathematical rigor of that equation whilst
keeping its general conceptual structure. But contemporary statistical me-
chanics tends to treat the Boltzmann equation in a different (more explic-
itly probabilistic) way, as well as incorporating a wide range of additional
examples.
3. Engaging fully with quantum as well as classical mechanics. It is common
to see, in foundational discussions, the claim that the relevant issues go
over from classical to quantum mutatis mutandis, so that we can get away
with considering only classical physics. Sklar (1993, p.12) is typical:
the particular conceptual problems on which we focus — the
origin and rationale of probability distribution assumptions over
initial states, the justification of irreversible kinetic equations,
and so on — appear, for the most part, in similar guise in the
development of both the classical and quantum versions of the
theory. The hope is that by exploring these issues in the tech-
nically simpler classical case, insights will be gained that will
carry over to the understanding of the corrected version of the
theory.
I will argue that this position, while defensible as regards irreversibility,
fails radically for probability — something that could perhaps have been
predicted when we recall that quantum theory is itself an inherently prob-
abilistic theory.
In sections 2–6 I look at modern non-equilibrium statistical mechanics through
two detailed classes of example: dilute gases (including the famous Boltzmann
equation, where I contrast a modern, probabilistic analysis (section 3) with
Boltzmann’s own approach (section 4) and linear systems (in particular Brow-
nian motion in an oscillator environment, which gives rise to the stochastic
Langevin equation and the related Fokker-Planck equation). In both cases, the
name of the game is to derive closed-form equations from some coarse-grained
description of the system. And two common features of these derivations stand
out: explicit and irreducible appeal to the Liouville form of classical mechanics,
and a concrete, quantitative condition for irreversibility expressed in terms of
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an initial-state condition that constrains the residual (i. e. , non-coarse-grained)
features.
In sections 7–12 I consider the quantum case, first in general terms (section
7), where the analogy between quantum mixed states and classical probability
distributions turns out to be superficial, and then in the concrete context of the
quantum versions of the dilute gas and of Brownian motion — where “quantum
version” does not mean “some new system, analogous to the old”, but “the same
old system, analysed correctly once we remember that quantum mechanics is the
correct underlying dynamics”. I conclude that while the problem of irreversibil-
ity looks pretty similar classically and quantum-mechanically, the problem of
probability is radically transformed: statistical-mechanical probabilities reduce
entirely to quantum-mechanical ones.
The physics discussed in this paper is standard and I do not give origi-
nal references. I have followed Balescu (1997) (for dilute gases), Zeh (2007)
and Zwanzig (1960, 1966) for the general linear-systems formalism, Zwanzig
(2001) for the Langevin and Fokker-Planck equations, Paz and Zurek (2002) for
the perturbative derivation of the Fokker-Planck equation, Peres (1993) for the
phase-space version of quantum mechanics, and Liboff (2003) for the quantum
version of the BBGKY hierarchy.
2 The BBGKY hierarchy and the Vlasov equa-
tion
Consider N indistinguishable classical point particles (for very large N : 106 at













V (qi − qj). (3)
With the right choices of the interaction term V , this might describe the particles
in a ‘classical’ gas or plasma, or the stars in a galaxy or cluster.
A standard move in contemporary statistical mechanics is to consider the
evolution of a probability distribution ρ over phase space under the Hamiltonian
dynamics defined by this Hamiltonian. (Thus probability is introduced explicitly
and by hand; I offer no justification for this at this stage, beyond the fact that
it is in fact routinely done!) It is well known that any such distribution evolves
by the Liouville equation,
d
dt














If we assume the distribution ρ is symmetric under particle interchange (or,
equivalently, if we just work with the symmetrised version of ρ, which is em-
pirically equivalent), and if we write xi, schematically, for the six coordinates
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dx iρ(x1, . . . xN ). (5)
ρm represents the probability that a randomly-selected M -tuple of particles will
be found in a given region of their M -particle phase space. We can, iteratively,
define m-particle correlation functions: the 2-particle correlation function is
c2(x
1, x2) = ρ2(x
1, x2)− ρ1(x1)ρ1(x2), (6)
the three-particle correlation function is
c3(x
1, x2, x3) = ρ3(x
1, x2, x3)− ρ1(x1)ρ1(x2)ρ1(x3)
− ρ2(x1, x2)c2(x3)− ρ2(x1, x3)c2(x2)− ρ2(x2, x3)c2(x1) (7)
and so forth.
The BBGKY hierarchy (named for Bogoliubov, Born, Green, Kirkwood
and Yvon) is a rewriting of the Liouville equation in terms of the n-particle
marginals. For each M , an equation of motion can be written down that is









dxM+1∇V (qi − qM+1) · ∂ρM+1
∂pi
(8)
So the first equation in the hierarchy can be used to determine the evolution of
ρ1, but only given the value of ρ2; the latter can in turn be determined from the
second equation, and so forth. For instance, the first equation in the hierarchy,
d
dt
ρ1 = {H1, ρ1}+ (N−1)
∫
dx2∇V (q1 − q2) · ∂ρ2
∂p2
, (9)
is the equation for free-particle motion plus a correction term linear in the two-
particle marginal.
The last equation in the hierarchy is just the N -particle Liouville equation,
and the full system of equations does not take us beyond that equation. The
value of the hierarchy is that it allows us to define various approximations. If
we can justify assuming that the M + 1-particle marginals are negligible, we
can truncate the hierarchy at the Mth equation and obtain a closed system of
equations for ρM . The grounds for that assumption will have to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis, but crucially, any such assumption does not in itself
contain any statement of time asymmetry.
For instance, the collisionless approximation takes c2 ' 0, i. e. ρ2(x1, x2) '
ρ1(x
1)ρ1(x
2) (and also N−1 ' N) and closes the first equation in the hierarchy
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to give a self-contained equation in ρ1: the Vlasov equation,
d
dt





widely used in plasma physics and galactic dynamics. This approximation is
justified by (a) assuming the initial multiparticle correlations are negligible;
(b) making additional assumptions about the initial state and the dynamics
which jointly entail that negligible multiparticle correlations remain negligible.
Under these assumptions the equation, which on its face describes a one-particle
probability distribution, can also be taken to describe the actual distribution of
particles when averaged over regions large compared to (total system volume /
N).
I make no claim that the assumptions used to derive the Vlasov equation
have been rigorously demonstrated to entail it. But they don’t appear to differ
from the general run of the mill in mainstream theoretical physics in their level
of rigor. And, since they do not distinguish a direction of time, nor does the
Vlasov equation: it is probabilistic, but time-reversal-invariant. (It is, however,
nonetheless highly non-trivial, despite its superficial resemblance to the one-
particle version of the Poisson equation: in particular, the second term in the
equation is non-linear in ρ1.) Irreversibility will require a more complicated
equation, to which I now turn.
3 The Boltzmann equation: a modern approach
Let’s relax the collisionless assumption, but only slightly: in the dilute-gas as-
sumption, we assume that three-particle correlations are negligible. We also
assume a two-particle interaction potential V that decreases rapidly with dis-
tance, so that the nonlinear term in the Vlasov equation is negligible. The first
two equations in the BBGKY hierarchy are now a closed set of equations in ρ1
and c2, which after some manipulation (see Balescu (1997, ch.7) for the details)




ρ1(t) = {H1, ρ1}+
∫ t
0
dτ K(τ)(ρ1 ⊗ ρ1)(t− τ) + Λ(t) · c2(0) (11)
Here I write (ρ1⊗ρ1)(x1, x2, t) ≡ ρ1(x1, t)ρ1(x2, t), and suppress the dependence
of ρ1 and c2 on anything except time. Λ(t) and K(t) are time-dependent linear
operators whose precise form will not be needed.
This equation holds only for t > 0, and might appear to describe explic-
itly time-reversal-noninvariant dynamics. It does not: it has been derived from
the dilute-gas approximation without further assumptions and the latter as-
sumption is time-reversal (and time-translation) invariant. The time reverse of
the equation holds for t < 0, and the whole system distinguishes no preferred
direction or origin of time.
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It can now be demonstrated — and again, this is a mathematical result,
the rigor of which can be questioned but which involves no additional physical
assumptions — that K(τ)ρ1 ⊗ ρ1(t − τ) decreases very rapidly with time, so
that (for times short compared to the recurrence time T of the system) we can
approximate the third term in (11) by∫ t
0





(ρ1 ⊗ ρ1)(t). (12)
And in fact the expression on the right hand side is equal to the well-known
Boltzmann collision term κ[σ, ρ1(t)], which depends on ρ1(t) (quadratically) and
on the scattering cross-section σ(pp′ → kk′) for two-particle scattering under
the interaction potential V . (The latter can be calculated by standard methods
of scattering theory.)
The equation (11) can now be approximated as
d
dt
ρ1(t) = {H1, ρ1(t)}+ κ[σ, ρ1(t)] + Λ(t) · c2(0). (13)
This differs from the full Boltzmann equation,
d
dt
ρ1(t) = {H1, ρ1(t)}+ κ[σ, ρ1(t)], (14)
only by the final term Λ(t) · c2(0), which is a dependency of the rate of change
of ρ1 at time t on the initial two-particle correlation function.
In textbooks (see, e. g. , Balescu (1997, ch.7), one can find heuristic argu-
ments to the effect that this term can be expected to be negligible (perhaps
after some short ‘transient’ period): indeed, Balescu quotes Prigogine and co-
workers as referring to the Λ(t) · c2(0) term as the destruction term. But this
assumption needs to be treated cautiously: the Boltzmann equation is time-
reversal noninvariant, and so the assumption that this term vanishes must in
some way build in assumptions that break the time symmetries of the problem.
And indeed, the heuristic arguments would fail if a precisely arranged pattern
of delicate correlations were present at time 0: they rely on certain assumptions
of genericity about those correlations.
Following Wallace (2010), let’s call an initial two-particle correlation func-
tion (and, by extension, an initial probability distribution satisfying our other
assumptions) forward compatible if Λ(t)·c2(0) is negligible for at least 0 < t T .
Then we have established that systems whose initial state is forward compatible
will obey the Boltzmann equation.
How are we to think about this assumption? I can see three options:
1. At one extreme, we could simply posit that a system’s state is forward
compatible, and derive from this that it obeys the Boltzmann equation.
This is dangerously close to circularity: to say that a state is forward
compatible is close to saying just that it obeys the Boltzmann equation.
The formal machinery developed here allows us to sidestep that circularity:
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to say that a correlation function satisfies Λ(t) · c2(0) ' 0 is equivalent
to saying that its forward time evolution satisfies the Boltzmann equation
only given significant, non-trivial mathematical work. But we are still left
with little clarity as to what this obscure mathematical expression means,
and in particular, we fail to connect to the heuristic arguments that this
term can in some sense be ‘expected’ to vanish for ‘reasonable’ choices of
c2(0).
2. At the other extreme, we could exploit the linearity of Λ(t) to observe that
if c2(0) vanishes, the troublesome term is removed entirely. So this state,
at least, is certainly forward compatible: positing that the initial state is
uncorrelated thus suffices to guarantee that the Boltzmann equation holds
for 0 < t  T . However, it is much stronger than is required (we expect
that a great many other choices of correlation are also forward compat-
ible) and somewhat physically implausible (a totally uncorrelated dilute
gas will swiftly build up some correlations, and indeed we can write an
explicit equation for them; if they really were negligible at all times, the
Boltzmann equation would reduce to the Vlasov equation). And again,
this assumption fails to engage with the heuristic arguments for the van-
ishing of Λ(t) · c2(0) for ‘reasonable’ initial states.
3. An intermediate strategy (suggested in Wallace (2010)) is to assume Sim-
plicity : the assumption that the initial state’s correlations can be de-
scribed in a reasonably simple mathematical form. (We need to explic-
itly bar descriptions that involve starting with a simple sate, evolving it
forward, and then time-reversing it!) We have heuristic, but extremely
strong, grounds to assume that Simple states are forward compatible.
The second and third of these assumptions, counter-intuitively, are time-reversal
invariant: Simple states time reverse to simple states, uncorrelated states to
uncorrelated ones. But they are not time translation invariant: their forward
and backward time evolutes violate the condition. Imposing either condition
guarantees (or, for the simplicity assumption, is heuristically likely to guarantee)
that the Boltzmann equation holds for 0 < t  T , and that its time reverse
holds for 0 > t > −T . So such conditions can only be imposed at the beginning
of a system’s existence, on pain of experimental disconfirmation.
Superficially, it is easy to make the argument that simplicity, at least, can
naturally be expected from a physical process that creates a system: such pro-
cesses cannot plausibly be expected to generate delicate patterns of correlations.
(The same might be said for the straightforward assumption of forward com-
patibility.) But again, this is not innocent: the time reversal of a system’s final
state, just before its destruction, is certainly not forward compatible, and so
our argument builds in time-directed assumptions. Assuming that we seek a
dynamical explanation for irreversibility (and are not content, for instance, to
appeal to unanalysable notions of agency or causation) then a familiar regress
beckons, and we are led to assume some condition analogous to forward com-
patibility or simplicity, applied to the very early Universe. (I discuss this issue
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in more detail in Wallace (2010).)
In any case, for the purposes of this paper, what matters is that we have
identified the time-asymmetric assumption being made in (a modern derivation
of) the Boltzmann equation: it is an assumption about the initial condition of
the system, phrased probabilistically (it is a constraint on the two-particle corre-
lation function, which is inherently probabilistic) and with no implications as to
the bulk distribution of particles in the system (insofar as these are coded by the
one-particle marginal, given that all higher-order correlations are small). It will
be instructive to compare this to the situation in Boltzmann’s own derivation
of the Boltzmann equation.
4 The Boltzmann equation: contrast with the
historical approach
The equation derived by Boltzmann himself2 has the same functional form as
what I have called the Boltzmann equation (albeit Boltzmann confined his at-
tention to the case where ρ1 is spatially constant, so that the free-particle term
{H1, ρ1} vanishes). But its interpretation is quite different. To Boltzmann, ρ1
was not a probability distribution: it was a smoothed version of the actual dis-
tribution function of particles over 1-particle phase space, so that ρ1(q,p)δV is
the actual fraction of particles in a region δV around (q,p). (The smoothing is
necessary because, with a finite number of point particles, ρ1 would otherwise
just be a sum of delta functions.)
Boltzmann makes a number of simplifying assumptions about the dynam-
ics (notably: that collisions are hard-sphere events; that three-body collisions
can be neglected; that long-distance interactions can be neglected) which are
time-reversal invariant and broadly equivalent to the time-reversal-invariant
assumptions made in the modern derivation. He then assumes the famous
Stosszahlansatz (SZA): the assumption that the subpopulation of particles which
are about to undergo a collision has the same distribution of momenta as the
population as a whole. Given this assumption, imposed over a finite time inter-
val [0, τ ], he then deduces that over that time interval the Boltzmann equation
holds. The assumption is thus explicitly time-reversal-noninvariant: assuming
that ρ1 is not stationary, if it holds over an interval then its time reverse cannot
hold over that interval. (If it did, then both the Boltzmann equation and its
time reverse would hold over that interval, contradicting Boltzmann’s famous
H-theorem, which tells us that the function H[ρ] monotonically increases during
the evolution of any non-stationary distribution under the Boltzmann equation.)
From a formal perspective, the probabilistic derivation in section 3 has sig-
nificant advantages over the historical approach. (Perhaps unsurprisingly, given
that it has in fact largely supplanted the historical approach in theoretical
physics.) In particular:
2Here I follow Brown et al ’s (2009)’s account of Boltzmann’s work; see that paper for
original references.
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1. The SZA is a condition that must hold throughout an interval of time if
that system is to obey the Boltzmann equation over that interval of time.
But whether a condition holds at time t > 0 is dynamically determined
by the system’s state at time 0, and Boltzmann’s derivation provides little
insight as to what constraint on the state at time 0 suffices to impose the
SZA at later times. Lanford’s celebrated proof of the Boltzmann equation
(Lanford (1975, 1976, 1976); carefully discussed by Valente (2014) and
Uffink and Valente (2015)) demonstrates that imposing (a generalisation
of) the SZA at time 0 suffices to guarantee that it holds over some [0, τ ]
— but τ is extremely short, only a fifth of a mean free collision time.
By contrast, the probabilistic approach provides an explicit condition —
Λ(t) · c2(0) ' 0 for 0 < t < T — for when the Boltzmann equation holds,
and allows us to state in closed form at least one correlation function —
c2(0) = 0 — that guarantees that the condition will continue to hold.
(To be fair, Lanford’s results are at a much higher level of rigor than the
probabilistic derivation, so a reader’s assessment of this point will depend
on their degree of tolerance of the mathematical practices of mainstream
theoretical physics.)
2. The framework of the probabilistic approach readily generalises. On slightly
different assumptions about the dynamics, for instance, it leads to Lan-
dau’s kinetic equation (governing weak collision processes) or to the Lenard-
Balescu equation (governing collisional plasmas). Boltzmann’s original
approach does not seem to have offered a comparably effective framework
for the construction of other statistical-mechanical equations.
3. Most significantly, and as I will discuss further in section 10, the probabilis-
tic approach readily transfers to quantum mechanics, where Boltzmann’s
original approach appears to fail completely.
Against this, Boltzmann’s original approach might be thought to have a
major conceptual advantage over the probabilistic approach, precisely because
it eschews problematic notions of probability that seem to have no natural place
in classical mechanics given that the latter features a deterministic dynamics.
(Harvey Brown presses the point in his contribution to this volume.) To be blunt
(the critic might say) then if progress in theoretical physics has moved from
Boltzmann’s original, relative-frequency, conception of the Boltzmann equation
to a conception that relies on a mysterious concept of objective probability, then
so much the worse for progress.
In my view, the ultimate resolution of this problem is quantum-mechanical:
when we consider quantum statistical mechanics, these probabilities receive a
natural interpretation. But even setting quantum theory aside, it is not obvi-
ous that the criticism is well-founded. For one thing, probabilistic notions are
frequently appealed to in discussions of the Boltzmann equation, even where
the latter is understood a la Boltzmann: see Brown et al (2009) as regards
Boltzmann’s own derivation, and Uffink and Valente (2015) in the context of
Lanford’s more rigorous analysis. So it is not after all clear that some notion of
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probability is not required — in which case, why object to incorporating it into
the equations themselves?
More importantly, conceptual analyses have to answer to the actual shape
of theoretical physics, at least insofar as the latter is empirically successful. I
have already noted that several generalisations of the Boltzmann equation can
be derived within the probabilistic framework but (so far as I know) have not
been demonstrated within Boltzmann’s conception of the equation.
Now, these equations, whatever their derivation, are expressions of the one-
particle marginal and can be reinterpreted without empirical consequence as
equations in the actual relative frequency of particles’ phase-space locations.
But classical statistical mechanics also offers examples where the predictions of
the theory are themselves probabilistic in nature. In the next section, I present
one such example; it will also serve as a demonstration that the analysis of
irreversibility in section 3 is more general than just the Boltzmann equation.
5 Mori-Zwanzig projection and the Fokker-Planck
equation
Let’s now consider a different Hamiltonian:
H(Q,P, q, p) =
P 2
2M









(where functional dependence on q, p schematically depicts dependence on all
of the qi, pi). This describes a single particle in one dimension (with position Q
and momentum P ) (the ‘system’) interacting with a bath of harmonic oscillators
(the ‘environment’); it is one common model for Brownian motion. Again we
introduce probabilities explicitly via a probability density ρ over the phase space
for the N + 1 particles, and take Liouville’s equation as the basic dynamical
equation for this system. That distribution can be decomposed as
ρ(Q,P, q, p) = ρS(Q,P )ρE(q, p) + C(Q,P, q, p) (16)
where ρS and ρE are, respectively, the marginal probability distributions over
system and environment, and C is the correlation function between the two.
Heuristically we might hope to find:
• that there is an autonomous dynamics for the single particle (assuming
that it is massive compared to the bath particles and that there are very
many of the latter, so that their influence is a kind of background noise);
• that the environment marginal ρE is pretty much constant during the






i2 + p2i ) (17)
of the bath.
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With that in mind, we define the following projection map on the space of
distributions:
Jρ(Q,P, q, p) = ρS(Q,P )E(q, p). (18)
Here ρS is the system marginal distribution of ρ, and E is some fixed distribution
for the environment, satisfying
{HE , E} = 0. (19)
(Typically we take E to be the canonical distribution for some given tempera-
ture.) Then we can write ρ itself as
ρ = Jρ+ (1− J)ρ ≡ ρr + ρi. (20)
This is actually a special case of a general process — the Mori-Zwanzig projection
— for constructing autonomous dynamical equations in statistical mechanics.
The components ρr = Jρ and ρi = (1−J)ρ are called, respectively, the relevant
and irrelevant parts of ρ, and the hope is that an autonomous dynamics can be
found for ρr alone — given certain assumptions about ρi. The decomposition
of the two-particle marginal in the Boltzmann distribution into a product of
one-particle marginals and a residual correlation term has a similar structure –
but in that case, the projection that defines the decomposition is nonlinear).
Without any approximation, we can obtain an integro-differential equation












LHρ ≡ {H, ρ} . (22)
This equation is exact, and so displays no irreversibility. However, if J has been
chosen appropriately then we would hope to find:
• That the kernel in the second term falls off sufficiently rapidly with τ that
it can be approximated as∫ t
0
dτ e(1−J)τLH (1− J)LHρr(τ) '
(∫ T
0




where T is some very long time of order the recurrence time.
• That the third term can plausibly be expected to vanish given some ‘rea-
sonable’ constraints on ρi(0).
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Given the first assumption, and defining
Λ(t) = JLHe
(1−J)tLH , (24)
we are left with the equation
d
dt
ρr(t) = JLHρr(t) +Kρr(t) + Λ(t)ρi(0) (25)
which is very similar in form to the proto-Boltzmann equation (13). No time-
asymmetric assumption has been made to get this far; we now have to make an
initial-time assumption about ρi(0) to guarantee that ρi(0) is forward compat-
ible, i. e. that Λ(t)ρi(0) ' 0 for 0 < t < T . As with the Boltzmann case, we can
guarantee this by taking ρi(0) = 0; as with the Boltzmann case, this is usually
overkill.
Returning to the specific case of the oscillator bath, we can calculate the
second term approximately by working to second order in perturbation the-
ory. Given a forward-compatible initial state (which, in this case, will typically
require at least that ρE(0) = E), we get the equation
d
dt
ρS(t) = {H̃S , ρS(t)}+η {X,PρS(t)}+α {X, {X, ρS(t)}}+f {X, {P, ρ}} (26)
where
H̃S = P
2/2M + V (Q) + ∆V (Q) (27)
and ξ, η, f and ∆Q are (somewhat complicated) functions of the λi coefficients
and the frequencies ωi of the oscillator bath. For reasonable assumptions, f
is usually negligible; equation (26) is then the Fokker-Planck equation, and we
can get insight into it by recognising that it is the equation for the probability
distribution of a particle evolving under the Langevin equation, the stochastic
differential equation
˙Q(t) = P (t)/M ; Ṗ (t) = −ηP (t) + ξ(t) (28)
where ξ(t) is a random variable satisfying
〈ξ(t)〉 = 0; 〈ξ(t1)ξ(t2)δt2〉 = 2αδt. (29)
(For details of both, see Zwanzig (2001, chs.1-2).)
These equations — which are highly effective at describing the physics of
Brownian motion — make explicitly probabilistic predictions: for instance, that
the root-mean-square value of the particle’s distance from its starting place after
time t is (after an initial transient phase) equal to 2αt/η2. Unlike the case of
Brownian motion, the equations cannot be reinterpreted as non-probabilistic
equations concerning the relative frequency of particles in a single system.
Incidentally, since the underlying Hamiltonian of this system is quadratic,
the appeal to second-order perturbation theory is dispensible: with a bit of care,
we can solve it exactly and confirm the approximate validity of equation (26).
See Paz and Zurek (2002) for details.
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6 Classical statistical mechanics: could do bet-
ter?
I began with the observation that non-equilibrium statistical mechanics is con-
cerned with establishing the relations between dynamical equations at different
levels of description, especially in the cases where the higher-level equations are
probabilistic and/or irreversible; I noted that it is mysterious how probability
or irreversibility can be derived from an underlying dynamics which has neither
feature, but that paying attention to the details of such derivations might be
illuminating.
We have now seen two such derivations in detail (conceptual detail at any
rate; the mathematics was left schematic), and I have argued that
1. The probabilistic features of the equations of statistical mechanics are not
readily removable: even in the case of the Boltzmann equation, which can
be reinterpreted as a non-probabilistic equation, its derivation is better
understood and more readily generalised when understood probabilisti-
cally, and in the case of the Fokker-Planck and Langevin equations, the
equations cannot even be reinterpreted non-probabilistically.
2. The irreversibility of at least a wide class of classical statistical-mechanical
equations (specifically, those which are either derived from the BBGKY
hierarchy via the same approximation scheme we used for the Boltzmann
equation, or derived by the Mori-Zwanzig method from a linear projection)
can be tracked to a cleanly-stated assumption about the initial microstate
— an assumption, however, which is again stated probabilistically.
3. No clue has been gleaned about the origins of the probabilities used in
these equations: in each case, our starting point was the Louville equation,
applied to a probability distribution placed by fiat on phase space.
So we are in the unsatisfactory position of having acquired considerable evidence
as to the importance and ineliminability of probabilities in non-equilibrium sta-
tistical mechanics, without gaining any insight at all into the origins of these
probabilities. In the rest of the paper, I will demonstrate that this dilemma
is resolved, or at least radically transformed, when we move from classical to
quantum mechanics.
7 Mixed states and probability distributions in
quantum statistical mechanics
At first sight, there is a straightforward translation scheme between classical and
quantum that maps the previous section’s results directly across to quantum
theory. To phase-space points correspond Hilbert-space rays. To Hamilton’s
equation corresponds Schrödinger’s. To probability distributions on phase space
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correspond density operators. To Liouville’s equation corresponds its quantum
counterpart,




Appearances, however, can be deceptive.
Von Neumann originally introduced the density operator to represent igno-
rance of which quantum state a system is prepared in: the idea is that if the
system is prepared in state |ψi〉 with probability pi, then for any measured
















pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| , (32)
the formula 〈X̂〉 = Tr(X̂ρ) neatly summarises our empirical predictions. But
it was recognised from the start that (32) cannot be inverted to recover the pi
and |ψi〉: many assignments of probabilities to pure states give rise to the same
ρ. By contrast, for any two distinct probability distributions over phase space
there is (trivially) some measurement whose expectation value is different on
the two distributions.
(It is true that if we add the extra information that the |ψi〉 are orthogonal,
and if we assume that ρ is non-degenerate, then the pi and the |ψi〉 can after
all be recovered. But (i) there is no particular problem in making sense of
probability distributions over non-orthogonal states; (ii) the density operators
used in statistical mechanics — particularly the microcanonical and canonical
distributions — are massively degenerate.)
That’s a puzzling disanalogy, to be sure, but hardly fatal. In these post-
positivist days, surely we can cope with a little underdetermination? But it
gets worse. For recall: a joint state of system A and system B is generically
entangled : it cannot be written as a product of pure states, and indeed there is
no pure state of system A that correctly predicts the results of measurements
made on system A alone. Indeed, the correct mathematical object to represent
the state of system A alone, when it is entangled with another system, is again
a density operator ρ, obtained by carrying out the partial trace over the degrees
of freedom of system B. (But this density operator cannot be understood as a
probabilistic mixture of pure states, on pain of failing to reproduce in-principle-
measureable Bell-type results.)
The corollary is that we can only represent a quantum system (or, indeed,
our information about a quantum system, if that’s your preferred way of under-
standing probabilities here) by a probability measure over pure states if with
probability 1 the system is not entangled with its surroundings. And in the case
of the macroscopically large systems studied in statistical mechanics, this is a
wildly implausible assumption: even if for some (already wildly implausible) rea-
son we were confident that at time 0 there was no entanglement between system
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and environment, some will develop extremely rapidly. (But note, conversely,
that simply assuming (or idealising) that the system is currently dynamically
isolated from its surroundings in no way rules out the possibility that it is en-
tangled with them.)
If we want to place a probability measure over states of a system, then, in
general the only option will be to place it over the system’s possible mixed states.
Mathematically, that’s straightforward enough: if a system has probability pi












But is clear that we get the exact same predictions by simply assigning the
system the single mixed state
∑
i piρi. In other words, probability distributions
over mixed states are indistinguishable from individual mixed states.
Note how different this is from the classical case. Even formally (never mind
conceptually), the move from phase-space dynamics to distributional dynamics
is an extension of the mathematical framework of classical physics. But in
quantum mechanics, the move from pure states to density operators is forced
upon us by considerations of entanglement quite independently of any explicit
probabilistic assumption, and so there is nothing formally novel about their
introduction in statistical mechanics.
Put another way, any mathematical claim in quantum statistical mechanics
can be interpreted as a claim about the actual (perhaps mixed) state of the
system. Nothing formally requires us to interpret it as any kind of probability
distribution over quantum states.
Now, perhaps this would be unimpressive if the foundations of quantum sta-
tistical mechanics made major conceptual use of probabilistic ideas in deriving
their results: if, for instance, the arguments given for the mathematical form of
quantum statistical equilibrium relied on probabilistic ideas. But a casual pe-
rusal of the (fairly minimal) literature on quantum statistical mechanics serves
to disabuse one of this notion. From Tolman’s classic text Tolman (1938) to
modern textbook discussions, the norm is to start with classical statistical me-
chanics and then move from a probability distribution over phase-space points
to a probability distribution over eigenstates of energy drawn from a particular
basis. I don’t really know any way to make sense of this, but certainly it can’t
be made sense of as a probability distribution over possible states of the system
given that (a) there is absolutely no reason, given the massive degeneracy that
typically characterises the Hamiltonian of macroscopic systems, to prefer one
energy basis over another; (b) there is no a priori reason, even ignoring entan-
glement, to assume with probability 1 that the system is in an eigenstate of
energy; (iii) we shouldn’t ignore entanglement anyway, so assuming the system
is in any pure state is unmotivated.3
3Very occasionally (the only place I know is Binney et al (1992)) it is observed that
a probability distribution uniform over all pure states with respect to the natural(unitary-
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This is not to say that there is not high-quality, rigorous work on the foun-
dations of quantum statistical mechanics, or even on the form of the equilib-
rium distributions (for recent examples see Goldstein et al (2006), Malabarba
et al (2014), and Short (2011)). But insofar as these arguments avoid the above
fallacies, they do so because they try to establish (or at any rate can be in-
terpreted as trying to establish) that the actual mixed state of a system at
equilibrium is the microcanonical or canonical ensemble, not that the correct
probability distribution over such states reproduces that ensemble.
I conclude that there is no justification, and no need, for interpreting the
mixed states used routinely in quantum statistical mechanics as any kind of
probability distribution over quantum states, rather than as the (mixed) quan-
tum states of individual systems. And if that is the case, then — since in
the real world “classical” systems are just quantum systems that we can get
away with approximating as classical — it becomes at least very tempting to
interpret the ‘probability’ distributions of classical mechanics simply as classical
limits of individual quantum states, without any need at all for a distinctively
statistical-mechanical conception of probability.
In fact — at least for the non-equilibrium systems we have considered so far
— this move is not just tempting, but compulsory. As we will see, it is simply
not viable to interpret these systems as probability distributions over localised
quasi-classical systems, once quantum mechanics is taken into account.
8 The quantum mechanics of dilute gases
The dilute gas of hard spheres is the paradigm example in classical statistical
mechanics, both in considering the approach to equilibrium (the Boltzmann
equation assumes this system) and in analysing equilibrium itself. But what
happens when quantum mechanics is used to analyse a system of this kind?
Let us begin with some parameters. The typical gas at standard temperature
and pressure has a molecular mass of around 10−26 or 10−27 kg, a molecular
scale of around 10−10 m, a density of about 1 kg m−3, and typical molecular
velocities of around 102 or 103 m s−1; for definiteness, let’s assume our gas is
confined in a 1m3 box, and that it consists of 1027 hard spheres of mass 10−27
kg and cross-sectional area 10−20m2 moving at a mean speed of 103 m s−1.
If classical microdynamics is to be a good approximation for this system,
presumably this means that the particles in the gas must be, and remain, lo-
calised. So let’s start the system off in some (probably unknown) state in which
each molecule is a localised wavepacket with a reasonably definite position and
momentum. We can now use approximately classical means to consider how
those wavepackets evolve prior to their first collisions.
Elementary methods tell us that for a gas with these parameters, the mean
free path — the mean distance travelled by a given particle before it collides
invariant) measure on states gives the same density operator as a distribution uniform over a
particular orthonormal basis, and that this is the justification for the latter; even here, though,
the problem of mixed states is left unanswered.
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with another — is 10−7m. The typical particle will cover this distance in 10−10
seconds.
How wide will its wavepacket be at that time? Let its original width be
∆q(0), so that its initial spread ∆p in momentum is at least∼ h̄/∆q(0). Roughly
speaking, its additional spread in position as a result of this spread in momentum
after time t will be t×∆p/m, so that its total spread after time t is given by













For the parameters governing our ideal gas, this means that the minimum size
of the packet after collision is approximately 3× 10−8 m.4
But this is thirty times the diameter of the molecule! To a rough approxi-
mation, the first set of scattering events in our dilute gas will be well modelled
by plane-wave scattering off a hard-sphere scattering surface. The resultant
joint state of two scattering particles will be a sum of two terms: one (much
the larger one) corresponding to the state of the two particles in the absence of
their interaction, and one an entangled superposition of the particles after scat-
tering, with significant amplitude for any direction of scattering. Each particle’s
individual mixed state will be highly delocalised.
This is fairly obviously nothing like the classical microdynamics, in which
each pair of particles deterministically scatters into a specific post-collision state
determined entirely by the pre-collision state. A quantum-mechanical dilute gas,
even if it is initially highly localised, rapidly evolves into a massively entangled
and massively delocalised mess. So the classical microdynamics that underpins
the derivation of Boltzmann’s equation (either in the ‘modern’ form I presented
in section 3, or in Boltzmann’s original derivation) is wildly false for real, phys-
ical gases.
Let’s be clear about what we have learned here. The point is not that
there are quantum regimes where the classical Boltzmann equation breaks down.
There are such regimes, of course: the statistical mechanics literature is replete
with discussions of “quantum” gases, but in general this refers to situations
where the intermolecular interaction has some complex quantum form, or (more
usually) where the gas is sufficiently dense that the effects of Bose-Einstein or
Fermi-Dirac statistics come into play, or where (as in the photon or phonon
gas) particle number is not conserved. But I am not considering that situation;
nor am I considering the situations where the quantum Boltzmann equation is
appropriate (as discussed by Brown, this volume). There is abundant empirical
evidence that the particle distribution in ordinary, nonrelativistic, dilute gases
4Don’t be fooled into thinking that ‘decoherence’ will somehow preserve localisation to a
greater degree than this. These are microscopic particles: they don’t decohere, or rather: their
decoherence is caused by their collision with other particles, and we’re explicitly considering
the between-collision phase.
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is governed by the classical Boltzmann equation — and yet, we have seen that
in those gases, the microdynamics assumed in the derivations of that equation
is simply incorrect.
Why, then, do these derivations work? To address this question, it will be
useful to adopt a representation of quantum-mechanical systems as functions
on phase space (as distinct from the usual representations on configuration or
momentum space); doing so will also cast light more generally on the relation
between quantum states and classical probability distributions.
9 The quantum/classical transition on phase space
In the position representation of a quantum state, information about the prob-
ability of a given result on a position measurement can be readily read off the
quantum state via the mod-squared amplitude rule, whereas information about
results of momentum measurements are encoded rather inaccessibly in the phase
variation of the wavefunction. In the momentum representation, the reverse is
true. A phase space representation can be seen as enabling us to more readily
access both lots of information.
An alternative way of understanding quantum mechanics on phase space is
more direct: if the position representation is optimised for position measure-
ments, and the momentum representation for momentum measurements, how
can we represent the state in a way optimised for phase-space measurements?
One immediate objection is that the uncertainty principle forbids joint mea-
surements of position and momentum; in fact, though, it forbids only sharp
joint measurements. The by-now well-established formalism of “positive op-
erator valued measurements” (POVMs) allows for a wide variety of unsharp
measurements, including phase-space measurements.
Indeed, we can straightforwardly write down such a family of phase space
measurements: choose any wave-packet state |Ω〉, reasonably well localized in
position and momentum but otherwise arbitrary (Gaussians are good choices)
and let |q,p〉 denote the state obtained by translating the original state first
by q in position and then by p in momentum. (Here q and p are vectors
representing the M position and M momentum coordinates of our system; if it
consists of N particles, for instance, M = 3N .) Then the (continuously infinite)
family of operators (2π)−M |q,p〉 〈q,p| is a POVM. (See appendix for proof; the
equivalent result for Gaussian choices of the wavepacket is standard, but I am
not aware of a proof in quite this form.) Since these wavepacket states are not
orthogonal, they do not define a sharp measurement; however, if we partition
phase space into disjoint cells Ci which are large compared to the spread of







Π̂iΠ̂j ' δijΠ̂i. (37)
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The Husimi function, defined for quantum state ρ by
Hρ(q,p) = (2π)
−M 〈q,p| ρ |q,p〉 , (38)
can thus be consistently interpreted as a phase-space probability distribution
provided we do not probe it on too-small length scales. In fact, the Husimi
function can be inverted to recover |ψ〉, so in principle we could use it as our
phase-space representation; however, for our purposes it is inconvenient, and a





dx e2ip·x/h̄ 〈q−x| ρ |q+x〉 . (39)
The mathematical form of the Wigner function is not transparently connected
with anything physical, but in fact, if we use the Wigner function (which is real,
though not necessarily positive) as a probability measure, it will approximately
give the correct phase-space measurement probabilities if averaged over regions
large compared to h̄M . (Indeed, the Husimi function can be obtained from the
Wigner function merely by smearing it in position and momentum with the
respective mod-squared wavefunctions of the wavepacket state; one advantage
of the Wigner function is that it abstracts away from the need to specify a
particular choice of wavepacket state.)
The main virtue of the Wigner function is that its dynamics can be conve-
niently compared to the classical case. Recall that classical probability distri-
butions evolve by Liouville’s equation:
ρ̇ = {H, ρ} . (40)
Transforming the Schrödinger equation to the Wigner representation tells us
that the Wigner function satisfies









· (H,W ). (41)
Here {·, ·}MB , the Moyal bracket, is best understood via its series expansion:
assuming H has the standard kinetic-energy-plus-potential-energy form, we can
expand it as








So the dynamics of the Wigner function is the dynamics of the phase-space
probability distribution, together with correction terms in successively higher
powers of h̄, which suggests that ceteris paribus5 the corrections become negli-
gible for macroscopically large systems — and are exactly zero for free particles
in any case.
5The full story is more complicated, as stressed by Paz and Zurek (2002); see also my
discussion in Wallace (2012, ch.3).
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Let’s pause and consider these technical results from a conceptual view-
point. The natural question one ends up asking first, when confronted with
something like the Wigner function, is: why can’t we just suppose that this is
a classical probability distribution, and thus resolve the paradoxes of quantum
theory? And the usual answer given is: the Wigner function is generally6 not
nonnegative, which probability distributions have to be. But this is not the real
problem (if it were, we could shift to the Husimi distribution, which is reliably
nonnegative). The real problem is that there is no underlying microdynamics on
phase-space points such that the Wigner function’s (or the Husimi function’s)
dynamics can be seen as a probabilistic dynamics for that microdynamics.
Put another way, suppose we were simply given the Liouville equation. Our
interpretation of that equation as the evolution equation for a probability dis-
tribution rests on the fact that we can get back the Liouville equation as the
dynamics for probability distributions induced by Hamilton’s equations. (That
the latter are deterministic is not relevant; similarly, given the Fokker-Planck
equation we can justify reading it probabilistically by observing that it is the
probabilistic dynamics induced by the stochastic Langevin equation.)7
The point is this: the Wigner function is not a function on phase space in
the original understanding of phase space. It is not a function on a space which
can be physically interpreted as the space of possible positions and momenta
of point particles, for there are no such particles. It does, however, illustrate
that in certain regimes (those where the higher-order terms in its evolution can
be neglected, and in which the system is not probed on length-scales where the
uncertainty principle comes into play), there is an approximate isomorphism
between the dynamics of the quantum state and that of the classical probability
distribution. The classical limit of quantum mechanics, to quote Ballentine
(1990), is classical statistical mechanics.
To strengthen the point, consider the Wigner (or Husimi) functions of pure
states. They certainly do not correspond to delta functions on phase space, but
to extended distributions on phase space. Even quantum wave-packet states are
taken to Gaussian packets, not to delta functions: to probability distributions
(or quantum generalisations thereof), not to individual microstates.
Now: in certain contexts, those wavepackets avoid spreading out and evolve
so as to mirror the evolution of phase-space points under classical microdynam-
ics. In these contexts, it is perhaps reasonable to think of classical micrody-
namics as emerging as a limiting regime of quantum physics. But the contexts
6Specifically, it’s nonnegative for pure states only if those states are Gaussian; cf Hudson
(1974).
7A technical aside: at least formally, any linear map of a vector space to itself that preserves
the L1 norm and which preserves the subset of vectors with nonnegative coefficients in a given
basis can be interpreted as generated from a possibly-stochastic dynamics with respect to this
basis. So what is doing the technical work here is the fact that neither the Wigner function
nor the Husimi function have dynamical equations which can be extended to the space of all
functions on phase space without violating the basis-preservation rule, i. e. without mapping
some positive functions to negative ones. In the case of the Wigner function, the dynamical
rule fails to preserve positivity even on the subspace of functions that correspond to quantum
states, but this is not a requirement.
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in which this occurs are relatively narrow (corresponding to isolated systems
with large masses and non-chaotic dynamics; cf Zurek and Paz (1995) and Wal-
lace (2012, ch.3)) and do not include many of the typical contexts in which
“classical” statistical mechanics is applied, as we saw in the previous section.
10 The classical Boltzmann equation from a quan-
tum perspective
In the limiting case of a non-interacting dilute gas of atoms, Hamiltonian mi-
crodynamics is wildly false — yet Liouville dynamics is exactly correct. This
suggests a route to understanding the classical Boltzmann equation in a quan-
tum universe: if Liouvillian dynamics (applied, of course, to Wigner functions) is
approximately correct even for a dilute interacting gas, then the modern deriva-
tion of the Boltzmann equation via the BBGKY hierarchy will still go through.
And it is heuristically plausible that Liouvillian dynamics are approximately
correct for such systems: after all, the particles in the gas spend most of their
time moving freely, and in the free-particle regime Liouvillian and quantum
dynamics coincide.
In fact, we can easily go beyond heuristic plausibility. The BBGKY hierar-
chy, and the various marginals, can be defined for the Moyal-bracket dynamics
and the N-particle Wigner function exactly as for the Poisson-bracket dynamics
and the classical phase-space distribution: the functional form is identical in
both cases. As such, we can replicate the derivation of the Boltzmann equa-
tion by replacing Poisson with Moyal brackets throughout. Making the same
assumptions and approximations at each step, we again obtain equation (11):
d
dt
ρ1(t) = {H1, ρ1(t)}+ κ[σ, ρ1(t)] + Λ(t) · c2(0),
which reduces to the Boltzmann equation if the forward-compatibility condition
Λ(t) · c2(0) = 0 is satisfied.
Formally speaking, this differs from the classical Boltzmann equation only
in that σ is the quantum-mechanical, and not the classical, cross-section. But
in fact this is exactly what we need to explain the applicability of the Boltz-
mann equation: in actual usage, the cross-section used is invariably that cal-
culated by quantum mechanics if quantum and classical predictions differ. (In
the physics of nuclear or chemical reactions, for instance, we use a generalisa-
tion of the Boltzmann equation to handle multiple particle species, and include
quantum-derived cross sections for reactions that turn particles of one species
into particles of another.)
Conceptually, this equation is completely different, though: ρ1, and c2, are
features not of a probability distribution over an unknown classical microstate,
but of a single quantum state. There is not even any particular requirement for
that state to be a pure state (albeit that the ‘overkill’ condition, c2 = 0, does
require the true N -particle state to be mixed). In particular, there is nothing
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probabilistic about the forward-compatibility requirement: it is a constraint on
the actual quantum state.
Or, better: there is something probabilistic about ρ, and about the forward-
compatibility requirement, but only in the sense that there is something prob-
abilistic about the quantum state itself (however that probabilistic nature is to
be understood). The probabilities in the Boltzmann equation are not a new
species of probability: they are Born-rule quantum probabilities, in the classi-
cal limit where the Liouville equation (though not Hamilton’s equations) are
approximately valid.
At this point, let us revisit section 4’s comparision between a BBGKY deriva-
tion of the Boltzmann equation and Boltzmann’s own, probability-free, deriva-
tion. There, I suggested that the BBGKY derivation has the major virtues
of (1) providing a single and relatively tractable initial-time condition for the
Boltzmann equation to hold at later times; (2) generalising much more readily
to other statistical-mechanical contexts, and (3) most importantly, applying to
quantum mechanics; against this, I conceded that in the classical context it has a
greater reliance on a somewhat mysterious notion of statistical-mechanical prob-
ability (albeit that notion is clearly necessary in classical statistical mechanics,
as the Langevin equation also demonstrates).
From a quantum perspective, this disadvantage is entirely negated and the
force of (3) becomes clear. In a quantum universe, the statistical-mechanical
probabilities of the (classical) Boltzmann equation are nothing over and above
quantum probability, something which (however mysterious it might be) we are
already committed to. And in a quantum universe, the BBGKY derivation
remains largely unchanged, while Boltzmann’s original derivation relies on as-
sumptions about the microdynamics of the system in question that are clearly,
demonstrably, false.
11 The Fokker-Planck equation from a quantum
perspective
The Boltzmann equation is in practice used simply to make predictions about
the relative frequency of the particle distribution, so that its probabilistic nature
is somewhat obscured; I introduced the Langevin and Fokker-Planck equations
in section 5 to demonstrate that often the predictions (and not just the meth-
ods of derivation) of classical statistical mechanics are probabilistic: often the
equations that emerge in non-equilibrium statistical mechanics are stochastic.
In fact — at least in this particular example — those probabilities also turn
out to be quantum-mechanical probabilities, so that (for instance) Brownian
motion, in our universe, needs to be understood as a quantum-mechanically
random process, not simply as a consequence of our ignorance of the classical
microstate or something similar.
To elaborate: in section 5 I derived the Fokker-Planck equation starting from
the Liouville equation appropriate to a Hamiltonian that couples one large, with
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many small, harmonic oscillators, as a special case of the Mori-Zwanzig method
of projection. The latter translates across to quantum mechanics mutatis mu-





In the particular case of the coupled oscillators, since the system is quadratic its
phase-space dynamics are identical whether understood classically or quantum-
mechanically, so that equation (26) can be taken directly over to the quantum
context simply by replacing Poisson brackets with commutators and probability







[H̃S , ρS(t)] + γ
i
h̄




f [X, [P, ρS(t)]]. (44)
I have absorbed some factors of h̄ into the coefficients, following the conventions
of Paz and Zurek (2002).
This is an equation for the reduced state ρS(t) of the large oscillator, derived
by separating the combined state ρ(t) of large and small oscillators into
ρ(t) = ρS(t)⊗ E + ρI(t), (45)
for some fixed state E of the small oscillators, invariant under their self-Hamiltonian.
It is valid (to second order in perturbation theory, and after some short ‘tran-
sient’ period for the coefficients to settle down to their long-term values) when-
ever ρI(0) satisfies the forward compatibility conditions, and in particular when-
ever ρI(0) = 0, i. e. when the system and environment are initially uncorrelated.
Quantum-mechanical features of the equation show themselves only when it
is applied to highly non-classical states, such as coherent superpositions of
wavepackets in different regions: in that context, it is the standard decoherence
master equation of environment-induced decoherence, and rapidly decoheres
that superposition. But given as input a wavepacket, or an incoherent mixture
of wavepackets, then it exactly reproduces the classical probability dynamics.
Classically speaking (and assuming that the f coefficient is negligible) we
have already noted that those dynamics can be interpreted as the probability-
distribution evolution defined by the stochastic Langevin equation. But in the
classical case the probabilities arise entirely because the input environment state
ε is a probability distribution: the apparently-stochastic behaviour of the system
is a consequence of an explicitly probabilistic assumption about the environ-
ment. (Normally we assume E is the canonical distribution of the oscillators.)







for the environment, it is (as I argued in section 32) debatable at best whether
this state should be interpreted probabilistically. But suppose it is so inter-
preted: then we should actually regard EC as a probabilistic mixture of energy
eigenstates, and standard statistical arguments tell us that this probability dis-
tribution is dominated by eigenstates |{ni}〉 (where ni is the excitation number
of the ith oscillator) satisfying∑
i
(ni + 1/2)ωi ' 〈HE〉EC . (47)
Each such eigenstate is a perfectly valid choice for the environment state E , and
if we explicitly check the formulae for the coefficients in Paz and Zurek (2002),
we find that for the overwhelming majority of such states, the coefficients have
pretty much the same value as they would if calculated with the mixed state
EC .
But the initial state |ψ〉 〈ψ|⊗|{ni}〉 〈{ni}| is pure, and (whatever the right in-
terpretation of quantum-mechanical mixed states) contains no purely statistical-
mechanical probability assumptions. So the probabilities in the Fokker-Planck
equation derived from that initial state are purely quantum-mechanical. And if
we hold on (implausibly) to the statistical interpretation of EC , we find that its
statistical-mechanical probabilities make virtually no contribution to the proba-
bilities in its Fokker-Planck equation. This is radically unlike the classical case,
in which perfect knowledge of the environment’s microstate suffices (in principle)
to eliminate the probabilities entirely from the large oscillator’s dynamics.
As a final observation: it is fairly easy to show that the equilibrium state
of a Fokker-Planck oscillator is a thermal state at the same temperature as
its bath. Since this result holds even when the environment’s initial state is
a pure state as above, at least in this case the equilibrium state again has
to be interpreted purely quantum-mechanically, with no trace of statistical-
mechanical probabilities.
12 Conclusion
Classical non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, in its contemporary formula-
tions and across at least the wide class of applications considered in sections 2–5,
adds to Hamiltonian classical mechanics two additional components: probability
(via a move from Hamiltonian to Liouvillian dynamics) and irreversibility.
Irreversibility is introduced by some kind of boundary condition; that much
could have been deduced a priori given that it is not present in the underlying
dynamics (Hamiltonian or Liouvillian), but the common form of that condition
in BBGKY-derived or Mori-Zwanzig-derived statistical mechanics differs from
the two most-commonly-discussed such conditions in the philosophical litera-
ture:
• Unlike the commonly-discussed past hypothesis that the initial state of
the system (most commonly, the entire Universe) is low in entropy, the
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forward-compatibility conditions are conditions on the microstate, invisi-
ble at the coarse-grained level. (Low entropy, insofar as that is a condi-
tion on the coarse-grained state, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
Boltzmann or Fokker-Planck equations to hold.)
• Forward compatibility is closer to the Stosszahlansatz of Boltzmann’s own
approach to non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, which is also a condi-
tion on the microstructure of the system, invisible at the coarse-grained
level. But forward compatibility is (i) a condition on the Liouvillian, not
the Hamiltonian, state (and thus explicitly probabilistic); (ii) mathemat-
ically formulated as a condition on the initial state, not as a requirement
that must hold throughout the evolution period; (iii) demonstrably sat-
isfied by at least one class of initial states, namely those for which the
‘irrelevant’ part of the state vanishes.
Probability might be the most mysterious part of classical statistical mechan-
ics as long as it is understood in isolation from quantum theory — hence the
temptation of Brown and others to eliminate it. But as with other cases in the
philosophy of physics — the enormous success of quantum theory in the face
of the measurement problem, and of mainstream (non-algebraic) quantum field
theory in the face of renormalisation — it will not do simply to deny the coher-
ence of a probability-based statistical mechanics given its empirical success.
But in any case, this mystery is largely dissolved by quantum mechanics.
Though it is not often explicitly stated, the default assumption in foundations of
statistical mechanics is that quantum and classical statistical mechanics are re-
lated as in Figure 1: mixed-state quantum mechanics is obtained from pure-state
quantum mechanics via explicit addition of (mysterious) probabilities, just as
Liouvillian classical mechanics is obtained from Hamiltonian classical mechan-
ics, and the quantum/classical transition is from pure-state quantum mechanics
to Hamiltonian classical mechanics.







We have seen that this is not viable:
• The analogy between pure/mixed states and Hamiltonian/Liouvillian states
is superficial: mixed states are already required as part of the formalism
of quantum mechanics by subsystem considerations (section 7) and the
addition of mysterious additional probabilities does not therefore gener-
alise the dynamics in the quantum case as it does in the classical. Any
equation of quantum mechanics in which probability distributions over
(pure or mixed) states can always be reinterpreted as an equation about
individual mixed states, so there is no inference from the empirical success
of a given part of quantum statistical mechanics to the need for statistical-
mechanical probabilities.
• Study of the quantum-classical transition shows that quantum states (pure
or mixed) correspond to phase-space distributions, not to phase-space
points, and so argues for an understanding of that transition as a tran-
sition from quantum mechanics to Liouvillian, not Hamiltonian, classical
mechanics.
• Elementary considerations of wave-packet spreading, applied to dilute-gas
systems with realistic parameters, reveals that Hamiltonian mechanics
completely fails for such systems: inter-particle collisions are more like
plane-wave interactions than classical hard-sphere scattering, and lead
rapidly to a highly entangled state. So interpretation of the Boltzmann
equation as a one-particle-marginal probability distribution (or relative-
frequency description of) the trajectories of well-localised, deterministi-
cally evolving point particles is unjustified in our quantum universe. On
the other hand, the derivation of that equation from Liouvillian dynam-
ics via the BBGKY hierarchy remains valid even when the Liouvillian
dynamics are understood as an approximate description of Schrödinger
dynamics, and indeed can be replicated exactly, mutatis mutandis, in the
Wigner-function formalism.
• In a stochastic dynamics like the Brownian motion described by the Langevin
equation, once we consider it quantum-mechanically we find that the
stochasticity is itself quantum-mechanical, and persists even if the sys-
tem and its environment begins in a pure state.
There is, in short, abundant evidence that ‘statistical-mechanical’ probabilities
are just quantum-mechanical probabilities. Considerations of the structure of
quantum theory, of phase-space descriptions of quantum mechanics, and of spe-
cific models, all tell us that Liouvillian states need to be understood as quantum
states in the regime where the Liouville equation approximates the Schrödinger
equation, and not as application of a new notion of probability to Hamiltonian
dynamics. Hamiltonian dynamics is an approximation to Liouvillian dynamics
in certain regimes, not its underpinning.8 The correct relation between classical
8Of course, this is entirely compatible with the use of Hamiltonian dynamics as a formal
method to analyse Liouvillian dynamics.
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and quantum statistical mechanics is given by Figure 2.
Figure 2: Quantum and classical statistical mechanics: improved view
CM CSM





So in quantum statistical mechanics, one of the two puzzles of non-equilibrium
statistical mechanics — probability — is resolved, or at any rate reduced to the
problem of understanding quantum probabilities. The other puzzle — the sta-
tus of the assumptions underpinning irreversibility — translates over to the
quantum context mutatis mutandis; a fuller understanding of them must await
another day.
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dq dp |q,p〉 〈q,p| = 1̂. (49)
From this it follows that the continous family of operators (2π)−M |q,p〉 〈q,p|
is a POVM, or more rigorously that if phase space is decomposed into countably
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is a POVM. In this section, h̄ = 1.
To prove this, let |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 be arbitrary Hilbert-space vectors. Inserting
two complete sets of position eigenstates, we obtain
〈ψ|Π |ϕ〉 = (2π)−M
∫
dq dp dx dy 〈ψ|x〉 〈x|q,p〉 〈q,p|y〉 〈y|ϕ〉 . (51)
Now,
〈x|q,p〉 = 〈x|T̂pT̂q|Ω〉 = eix·p 〈x|T̂q|Ω〉 = eix·p 〈x+q|Ω〉 . (52)
So we can rewrite (51) as
〈ψ|Π |ϕ〉 = (2π)−M
∫
dq dp dx dy 〈ψ|x〉 〈x+q|Ω〉 〈Ω|y+q〉 〈y|ϕ〉 ei(x−y)·p.
(53)
The integral over p can now be evaluated, and gives a delta function factor,∫
dp ei(x−y)·p = (2π)Mδ(x− y), (54)
which we can in turn use to perform the integration over y, obtaining
〈ψ|Π |ϕ〉 =
∫
dq dx 〈ψ|x〉 〈x+q|Ω〉 〈Ω|x+q〉 〈x|ϕ〉 (55)







= 〈ψ|ϕ〉 〈Ω|Ω〉 = 〈ψ|ϕ〉 .
(56)
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